Initial Commit

5 files changed, 704 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/PKGBUILD b/PKGBUILD
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+++ b/PKGBUILD
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# $Id$
+# Maintainer: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
+# Contributor: Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com>
+# Contributor: henning mueller <henning@orgizm.net>
+# Contributor: s1gma <s1gma@mindslicer.com>
+# Contributor: Ahmad24 <myitrayan@gmail.com>
+# Contributor: maxrp <maxp@pdx.edu>
+
+pkgname=gradm
+_version=3.1
+_timestamp=201701031918
+pkgver=$_version.$_timestamp
+pkgrel=1
+pkgdesc="Administration utility for grsecurity's Role Based Access Control (RBAC)"
+arch=(i686 x86_64)
+url=https://grsecurity.net/
+license=(GPL2)
+depends=(pam)
+source=(https://grsecurity.net/stable/$pkgname-$_version-$_timestamp.tar.gz
+        https://grsecurity.net/stable/$pkgname-$_version-$_timestamp.tar.gz.sig
+        learn_config
+        policy)
+sha512sums=('3dbf33aff6b723af8f3bf6986fcf5fdab92bc6819b9f06074ec4e8cc52d47c0f9bc64c928d25f537160ecc9e00c3b212dce737214eea280c046c4c4ab2326a77'
+            'SKIP'
+            '2fd1e94e1ea7142ee939611d58d3537d5e5842d5f6d73b8837cc9b6900fb8e34c167ab61cfcde92c045a73bb10de1c841f61a41f3f65fb9def830a81bcb4bc13'
+            'a85569f7e950154cd56e1c092dc78f65d01e3f1afd067b9d5398e6bb265aeea144f3ca91f3780abab443a83432712597b9f01bfa7f2c4d7047fd2971b148f767')
+validpgpkeys=(
+              'DE9452CE46F42094907F108B44D1C0F82525FE49' # Bradley Spengler
+)
+
+prepare() {
+  cd $pkgname
+  sed -i -e 's/^CFLAGS :=/CFLAGS +=/' -e 's:sbin:usr/bin:' Makefile
+}
+
+build() {
+  cd $pkgname
+  make
+}
+
+package() {
+  cd $pkgname
+  make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
+  cp "$srcdir"/{learn_config,policy} "$pkgdir/etc/grsec"
+  rm -r "$pkgdir/dev"
+} 
diff --git a/gradm-3.1-201701031918.tar.gz b/gradm-3.1-201701031918.tar.gz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f141a15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gradm-3.1-201701031918.tar.gz
diff --git a/gradm-3.1-201701031918.tar.gz.sig b/gradm-3.1-201701031918.tar.gz.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4d4e73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gradm-3.1-201701031918.tar.gz.sig
diff --git a/learn_config b/learn_config
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index 0000000..1a4af2c
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+++ b/learn_config
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+#This configuration file aids the learning process by tweaking
+#the learning algorithm for specific paths.
+#
+#It accepts lines in the form of <command> <pathname>
+#Where <command> can be inherit-learn, no-learn, inherit-no-learn,
+#high-reduce-path, dont-reduce-path, protected-path, high-protected-path,
+#read-protected-path, and always-reduce-path
+#
+#inherit-learn, no-learn, and inherit-no-learn operate only with
+#full learning
+#
+#high-reduce-path, dont-reduce-path, always-reduce-path, protected-path, 
+#and high-protected-path operate on both full and and regular learning 
+#(subject and role learning)
+#
+#inherit-learn changes the learning process for the specified path
+#by throwing all learned accesses for every binary executed by the
+#processes contained in the pathname into the subject specified
+#by the pathname.  This is useful for cron in the case of full
+#system learning, so that scripts that eventually end up executing
+#mv or rm with privilege don't cause the root policy to grant
+#that privilege to mv or rm in all cases.
+#
+#no-learn allows processes within the path to perform any operation
+#that normal system usage would allow without restriction.  If
+#a process is generating a huge number of learning logs, it may be
+#best to use this command on that process and configure its policy
+#manually.
+#
+#inherit-no-learn combines the above two cases, such that processes
+#within the specified path will be able to perform any normal system
+#operation without restriction as will any binaries executed by
+#these processes.
+#
+#high-reduce-path modifies the heuristics of the learning process
+#to weight in favor of reducing accesses for this path
+#
+#dont-reduce-path modifies the heuristics of the learning process
+#so that it will never reduce accesses for this path
+#
+#always-reduce-path modifies the heuristics of the learning process
+#so that the path specified will always have all files and directories
+#within it reduced to the path specified.
+#
+#protected-path specifies a path on your system that is considered an
+#important resource.  Any process that modifies one of these paths
+#is given its own subject in the learning process, facilitating
+#a secure policy.
+#
+#read-protected-path specifies a path on your system that contains 
+#sensitive information.  Any process that reads one of these paths is
+#given its own subject in the learning process, facilitating a secure
+#policy.
+#
+#high-protected-path specifies a path that should be hidden from
+#all processes but those that access it directly.  It is recommended
+#to use highly sensitive files for this command.
+#
+#regular expressions are not supported for pathnames in this config file
+#
+#
+# uncomment this next line if you don't wish to generate a policy that 
+# restricts roles to specific IP ranges:
+# dont-learn-allowed-ips
+#
+# to write out your generated policy such that roles are split into separate
+# files by the name of the role (within user/group directories), uncomment
+# the next line:
+# split-roles
+
+always-reduce-path /dev/pts
+always-reduce-path /var/spool/qmailscan/tmp
+always-reduce-path /var/spool/exim4
+always-reduce-path /run/screen
+always-reduce-path /usr/share/locale
+always-reduce-path /usr/share/zoneinfo
+always-reduce-path /usr/share/terminfo
+always-reduce-path /var/abs
+always-reduce-path /tmp
+always-reduce-path /var/tmp
+
+high-reduce-path /run/udev
+high-reduce-path /dev/mapper
+high-reduce-path /dev/snd
+high-reduce-path /proc
+high-reduce-path /usr/lib/security
+high-reduce-path /usr/lib/modules
+high-reduce-path /usr/lib
+high-reduce-path /usr/lib32
+high-reduce-path /usr/libx32
+high-reduce-path /usr/lib/tls
+high-reduce-path /usr/lib32/tls
+high-reduce-path /usr/libx32/tls
+high-reduce-path /usr/lib/libreoffice
+high-reduce-path /var/lib
+high-reduce-path /usr/bin
+high-reduce-path /usr/sbin
+high-reduce-path /usr/local/share
+high-reduce-path /usr/local/bin
+high-reduce-path /usr/local/sbin
+high-reduce-path /usr/local/etc
+high-reduce-path /usr/local/lib
+high-reduce-path /usr/share
+high-reduce-path /usr/X11R6/lib
+high-reduce-path /var/lib/openldap-data
+high-reduce-path /var/lib/krb5kdc
+
+dont-reduce-path /
+dont-reduce-path /home
+dont-reduce-path /dev
+dont-reduce-path /usr
+dont-reduce-path /var
+dont-reduce-path /opt
+
+protected-path /etc
+protected-path /boot
+protected-path /run
+protected-path /usr
+protected-path /opt
+protected-path /var
+protected-path /dev/log
+protected-path /root
+protected-path /sys
+
+read-protected-path /etc/ssh
+read-protected-path /proc/kallsyms
+read-protected-path /proc/kcore
+read-protected-path /proc/slabinfo
+read-protected-path /proc/modules
+read-protected-path /usr/lib/modules
+read-protected-path /boot
+read-protected-path /etc/shadow
+read-protected-path /etc/shadow-
+read-protected-path /etc/gshadow
+read-protected-path /etc/gshadow-
+read-protected-path /sys
+
+high-protected-path /etc/ssh
+high-protected-path /proc/kcore
+high-protected-path /proc/sys
+high-protected-path /proc/bus
+high-protected-path /proc/slabinfo
+high-protected-path /proc/modules
+high-protected-path /proc/kallsyms
+high-protected-path /etc/passwd
+high-protected-path /etc/shadow
+high-protected-path /var/backups
+high-protected-path /etc/shadow-
+high-protected-path /etc/gshadow
+high-protected-path /etc/gshadow-
+high-protected-path /var/log
+high-protected-path /dev/mem
+high-protected-path /dev/kmem
+high-protected-path /dev/port
+high-protected-path /dev/log
+high-protected-path /sys
+high-protected-path /etc/ppp
+high-protected-path /etc/samba/smbpasswd
+#to protect kernel images
+high-protected-path /boot
+high-protected-path /usr/lib/modules
+high-protected-path /usr/src
+
+inherit-learn /etc/cron.d
+inherit-learn /etc/cron.hourly
+inherit-learn /etc/cron.daily
+inherit-learn /etc/cron.weekly
+inherit-learn /etc/cron.monthly 
diff --git a/policy b/policy
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+++ b/policy
@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
+#sample default policy for grsecurity
+#
+# Role flags:
+# A -> This role is an administrative role, thus it has special privilege normal
+#      roles do not have.  In particular, this role bypasses the 
+#      additional ptrace restrictions
+# N -> Don't require authentication for this role.  To access
+#      the role, use gradm -n <rolename>
+# s -> This role is a special role, meaning it does not belong to a
+#      user or group, and does not require an enforced secure policy
+#      base to be included in the ruleset
+# u -> This role is a user role
+# g -> This role is a group role
+# G -> This role can use gradm to authenticate to the kernel
+#      A policy for gradm will automatically be added to the role
+# T -> Enable TPE for this role
+# l -> Enable learning for this role
+# P -> Use PAM authentication for this role.
+# R -> Enable persistence of special role.  Normal special roles will
+#      be removed upon exit of the process that entered the role, or
+#      upon unauth (this is what changes the apache process' role back 
+#      to its normal role after being restarted from the admin role, for
+#      instance).  Role persistence allows a special role to be used for
+#      system shutdown, as the point at which the admin's shell/SSH 
+#      session is terminated won't cause the rest of the shutdown 
+#      sequence to execute with reduced privilege.  Do *NOT* use this 
+#      flag with any role that does anything but shut the system down.
+#      This role will also be transferred to the init process upon
+#      writing to /dev/initctl.  This allows init to execute the rc 
+#      scripts for shutdown with the necessary privilege.
+#      For usability reasons, we allow the removal of persistence through
+#      the normal unauth process (so persistence only survives exit).
+#
+# a role can only be one of user, group, or special
+#
+# role_allow_ip IP/optional netmask
+# eg: role_allow_ip 192.168.1.0/24
+# You can have as many of these per role as you want
+# They restrict the use of a role to a list of IPs.  If a user
+# is on the system that would normally get the role does not
+# belong to those lists of IPs, the system falls back through
+# its method of determining a role for the user
+#
+# Role hierarchy
+# user -> group -> default
+# First a user role attempts to match, if one is not found,
+# a group role attempts to match, if one is not found,
+# the default role is used.
+#
+# role_transitions <special role 1> <special role 2> ... <special role n>
+# eg: role_transitions www_admin dns_admin
+#
+# role transitions specify which special roles a given role is allowed
+# to authenticate to.  This applies to special roles that do not
+# require password authentication as well.  If a user tries to
+# authenticate to a role that is not within his transition table, he
+# will receive a permission denied error
+#
+# Nested subjects
+# subject /usr/bin/su:/usr/bin/bash:/usr/bin/cat
+#	  / rwx
+#	  +CAP_ALL
+# grant privilege to specific processes if they are executed
+# within a trusted path.  In this case, privilege is
+# granted if /usr/bin/cat is executed from /usr/bin/bash, which is
+# executed from /usr/bin/su.
+#
+# Configuration inheritance on nested subjects
+# nested subjects inherit rules from their parents.  In the
+# example above, the nested subject would inherit rules
+# from the nested subject for /usr/bin/su:/usr/bin/bash,
+# and the subject /usr/bin/su
+# View the 1.9.x documentation for more information on
+# configuration inheritance
+#
+# new object modes:
+# m -> allow creation of setuid/setgid files/directories
+#      and modification of files/directories to be setuid/setgid
+# M -> audit the setuid/setgid creation/modification
+# c -> allow creation of the file/directory
+# C -> audit the creation
+# d -> allow deletion of the file/directory
+# D -> audit the deletion
+# p -> reject all ptraces to this object
+# l -> allow a hardlink at this path
+#	(hardlinking requires at a minimum c and l modes, and the target
+#	 link cannot have any greater permission than the source file)
+# L -> audit link creation
+# f -> needed to mark the pipe used for communication with init
+#      to transfer the privilege of the persistent role; only valid
+#      within a persistent role.  Transfer only occurs when the file is 
+#      opened for writing
+# Z -> tells gradm to ignore earlier object of the same name and use this
+#      one instead
+#
+# new subject modes:
+# O -> disable "writable library" restrictions for this task
+# t -> allow this process to ptrace any process (use with caution)
+# r -> relax ptrace restrictions (allows process to ptrace processes
+#      other than its own descendants)
+# i -> enable inheritance-based learning for this subject, causing
+#      all accesses of this subject and anything it executes to be placed
+#      in this subject, and inheritance flags added to executable objects
+#      in this subject
+# a -> allow this process to talk to the /dev/grsec device
+# s -> enable AT_SECURE when entering this subject
+#      (enables the same environment sanitization that occurs in glibc
+#	upon execution of a suid binary)
+# x -> allows executable anonymous shared memory for this subject
+# Z -> tells gradm to ignore earlier subject of the same path and use this
+#      one instead
+#
+# user/group transitions:
+# You may now specify what users and groups a given subject can
+# transition to.  This can be done on an inclusive or exclusive basis.
+# Omitting these rules allows a process with proper privilege granted by
+# capabilities to transition to any user/group.
+#
+# Examples:
+# subject /usr/bin/su
+# user_transition_allow root spender
+# group_transition_allow root spender
+# subject /usr/bin/su
+# user_transition_deny evilhacker
+# subject /usr/bin/su
+# group_transition_deny evilhacker1 evilhacker2
+#
+# Domains:
+# With domains you can combine users that don't share a common
+# GID as well as groups so that they share a single policy
+# Domains work just like roles, with the only exception being that
+# the line starting with "role" is replaced with one of the following:
+# domain somedomainname u user1 user2 user3 user4 ... usern
+# domain somedomainname g group1 group2 group3 group4 ... groupn
+#
+# Inverted socket policies:
+# Rules such as
+# connect ! www.google.com:80 stream tcp
+# are now allowed, which allows you to specify that a process can connect to anything
+# except to port 80 of www.google.com with a stream tcp socket
+# the inverted socket matching also works on bind rules
+#
+# INADDR_ANY overriding
+# You can now force a given subject to bind to a particular IP address on the machine
+# This is useful for some chrooted environments, to ensure that the source IP they
+# use is one of your choosing
+# to use, add a line like:
+# ip_override 192.168.0.1
+#
+# Per-interface socket policies:
+# Rules such as
+# bind eth1:80 stream tcp
+# bind eth0#1:22 stream tcp
+# are now allowed, giving you the ability to tie specific socket rules 
+# to a single interface (or by using the inverted rules, all but one 
+# interface).  Virtual interfaces are specified by the <ifname>#<vindex>
+# syntax.  If an interface is specified, no IP/netmask or host may be
+# specified for the rule.
+#
+# Allowing additional socket families:
+# Before v2.2.1 of the RBAC system, a subject that specified
+# connect/bind rules limited only the socket usage of IPv4, allowing
+# any other socket families to be used.  Starting with v2.2.1 of the 
+# RBAC system, when connect/bind rules are used, additional rules
+# will be required to unlock the use of additional socket families 
+# (outside of the common unix family).  Multiple families can be
+# specified per line.
+# To enable use of IPv6, add the line:
+# sock_allow_family ipv6
+# To enable use of netlink, add the line:
+# sock_allow_family netlink
+# To enable all other families, add the line:
+# sock_allow_family all
+#
+# New learning system:
+# To learn on a given subject: add l (the letter l, not the number 1)
+# to the subject mode
+# If you want to learn with the most restrictive policy, use the 
+# following:
+# subject /path/to/bin lo
+#    / h
+#    -CAP_ALL
+#    connect disabled
+#    bind disabled
+# Resource learning is also supported, so lines like
+#    RES_AS 0 0
+# can be used to learn a particular resource
+#
+# To learn on a given role, add l to the role mode
+# For both of these, to enable learning, enable the system like:
+# gradm -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -E
+# and then generate the rules after disabling the system after the 
+# learning phase with:
+# gradm -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -O /etc/grsec/policy
+# To use full system learning, enable the system like:
+# gradm -F -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs
+# and then generate the rules after disabling the system after the 
+# learning phase with:
+# gradm -F -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -O /etc/grsec/policy
+#
+# New PaX flag format (replaces PaX subject flags):
+# PaX flags can be forced on or off, regardless of the flags on the 
+# binary, by using + or - before the following PaX flag names:
+# PAX_SEGMEXEC
+# PAX_PAGEEXEC
+# PAX_MPROTECT
+# PAX_RANDMMAP
+# PAX_EMUTRAMP
+#
+# New feature for easier policy maintenance:
+# replace <variable name> <replace string>
+# e.g.:
+# replace CVSROOT /home/cvs
+# now $(CVSROOT) can be used in any subject or object pathname, like:
+# $(CVSROOT)/grsecurity r
+# This will translate to /home/cvs/grsecurity r
+# This feature makes it easier to update policies by naming specific
+# paths by their function, then only having to update those paths once
+# to have it affect a large number of subjects/objects.
+#
+# capability auditing / log suppression
+# use of a capability can be audited by adding "audit" to the line, eg:
+# +CAP_SYS_RAWIO audit
+# log suppression for denial of a capbility can be done by adding "suppress":
+# -CAP_SYS_RAWIO suppress
+#
+# Per-role umask enforcement:
+# If you have a user that you want to be assured cannot accidentally
+# create a file that others can read (a confidentiality issue)
+# add the following under the role declaration:
+# role_umask 077
+# any normal octal umask may be specified
+# Note that unlike the normal umask, this umask will also apply
+# to the permissions one can chmod/fchmod a file to
+#
+# Note that the omission of any feature of a role or subject
+# results in a default-allow
+# For instance, if no capability rules are added in a subject without
+# policy inheritance ("o" in subject mode), an implicit +CAP_ALL is used
+#
+# Also note that policy inheritance does not exist for network policies, only
+# file objects and capabilities inherit policy
+#
+# Commonly-used objects can be defined and used in multiple subjects
+# As an example, we'll create a variable out of a list of objects
+# and their associated permissions that RBAC enforces
+# files, connect/bind rules, and capabilities can currently be added to a define
+
+define grsec_denied {
+	/boot		h
+	/dev/grsec	h
+	/dev/kmem	h
+	/dev/mem	h
+	/dev/port	h
+	/etc/grsec	h
+	/proc/kcore	h
+	/proc/slabinfo	h
+	/proc/modules	h
+	/proc/kallsyms	h
+	# hide and suppress logs about accessing this path
+	/usr/lib/modules	hs
+	/etc/ssh	h
+}
+# usage:
+# $grsec_denied
+
+role shutdown sARG
+subject / rvka
+	/
+	/dev
+	/dev/urandom	r
+	/dev/random	r
+	/etc		r
+	/usr		rx
+	/proc r
+	$grsec_denied
+	-CAP_ALL
+	connect disabled
+	bind disabled
+
+subject /usr/lib/systemd/systemd rvkao
+	/ rwcdmlxi
+subject /usr/bin/systemctl rvkao
+	/ rwcdmlxi
+	/dev/initctl rwf
+	/run/initctl rwf
+
+# Make sure to unauthenticate with gradm -u from
+# the admin role after restarting a service
+# The service started will run with admin
+# privileges until you run gradm -u or your shell exits
+
+role admin sA
+subject / rvka
+	/ rwcdmlxi
+
+role default G
+role_transitions admin shutdown
+subject /
+	/		r
+	/opt		rx
+	/home		rwxcd
+	/mnt		rw
+	/dev
+	/dev/urandom	r
+	/dev/random	r
+	/dev/zero	rw
+	/dev/input	rw
+	/dev/psaux	rw
+	/dev/null	rw
+	/dev/tty?	rw
+	/dev/console	rw
+	/dev/tty	rw
+	/dev/pts	rw
+	/dev/ptmx	rw
+	/dev/dsp	rw
+	/dev/mixer	rw
+	/dev/initctl	rw
+	/dev/fd0	r
+	/dev/sr0	r
+	/usr		rx
+# compilation of kernel code should be done within the admin role	
+	/usr/src	h
+	/etc		rx
+	/proc		rwx
+	/proc/sys	r
+	/sys		h
+	/root		r
+	/run		r
+	/tmp		rwcd
+	/var		rwxcd
+	/var/tmp	rwcd
+	/var/log	r
+# hide the kernel images and modules
+	$grsec_denied
+
+# if sshd needs to be restarted, it can be done through the admin role
+# restarting sshd should be followed immediately by a gradm -u
+	/usr/bin/sshd
+	
+	-CAP_KILL
+	-CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
+	-CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
+	-CAP_NET_RAW
+	-CAP_MKNOD
+	-CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+	-CAP_SYS_RAWIO
+	-CAP_SYS_MODULE
+	-CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+	-CAP_NET_ADMIN
+	-CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
+	-CAP_NET_RAW
+	-CAP_SYS_CHROOT
+	-CAP_SYS_BOOT
+	-CAP_SETFCAP
+	-CAP_SYSLOG
+
+#	RES_AS 100M 100M
+
+#	connect 192.168.1.0/24:22 stream tcp
+#	bind	0.0.0.0 stream dgram tcp udp
+
+# the d flag protects /proc fd and mem entries for sshd
+# all daemons should have 'p' in their subject mode to prevent
+# an attacker from killing the service (and restarting it with trojaned
+# config file or taking the port it reserved to run a trojaned service)
+
+subject /usr/bin/sshd dpo
+	/
+	/*		h
+	/usr/bin/bash	x
+	/dev		h
+	/dev/random	r
+	/dev/urandom	r
+	/dev/null	rw
+	/dev/ptmx	rw
+	/dev/pts	rw
+	/dev/tty	rw
+	/dev/tty?	rw
+	/etc		r
+	/etc/grsec	h
+	/home
+	/home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys r
+	/root
+	/proc		r
+	/proc/*/oom_adj rw
+	/proc/*/oom_score_adj rw
+	/proc/kcore	h
+	/proc/sys	h
+	/proc/sys/kernel/ngroups_max r
+	/selinux	r
+	/usr/lib	rx
+	/usr/lib32	rx
+	/usr/libx32	rx
+	/usr/share/zoneinfo r
+	/var/log
+	/var/spool/mail
+	/var/log/lastlog	rw
+	/var/log/wtmp		w
+	/var/run
+	/run
+	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	rw
+	/var/run/sshd
+	/var/run/utmp		rw
+	/var/run/utmpx		rw
+	/var/run/.nscd_socket	rw
+
+	-CAP_ALL
+	+CAP_CHOWN
+	+CAP_SETGID
+	+CAP_SETUID
+	+CAP_SYS_CHROOT
+	+CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
+	+CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
+	+CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
+	# to access user keys
+	+CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
+
+subject /usr/bin/Xorg
+	/dev/mem	rw
+
+	+CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+	+CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
+	+CAP_SYS_RAWIO
+
+subject /usr/bin/ssh
+	/etc/ssh/ssh_config r
+
+subject /usr/bin/postgres
+	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	rw
+
+subject /usr/bin/exim
+	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	rw
+
+subject /usr/bin/syslog-ng
+	+CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+
+subject /usr/bin/rsyslogd
+	+CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+
+subject /usr/bin/cron
+	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	rw
+
+subject /usr/bin/crond
+	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	rw
+
+subject /usr/bin/login
+	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	rw
+	/var/log/wtmp w
+	/var/log/faillog rwcd
+
+subject /usr/bin/su
+	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	rw
+
+subject /usr/bin/sudo
+	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	rw
+
+subject /usr/bin/agetty
+	/var/log/wtmp w
+
+subject /usr/bin/xauth
+	/home r
+	/home/*/.Xauthority-* rwcdl
+
+# prevent ld.so breakouts of subjects with /usr/lib rx
+
+# many distros clutter up /usr/lib with shell scripts
+# that can be easily hijacked for malicious purposes
+subject /usr/lib o
+	/ h
+	-CAP_ALL
+	connect disabled
+	bind disabled
+
+subject /usr/lib32 o
+	/ h
+	-CAP_ALL
+	connect disabled
+	bind disabled
+
+subject /usr/lib/ld-linux.so.2 o
+	/ h
+	-CAP_ALL
+	connect disabled
+	bind disabled
+subject /usr/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 o
+	/ h
+	-CAP_ALL
+	connect disabled
+	bind disabled